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CYBERSECURITY OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
IN THE ERA OF INTERNET OF THINGS
František Kasl*1
Abstract: The issues related to cybersecurity are being amplified by the growing role of the Internet of
Things devices in current digital economy. The focus of this contribution is to examine the challenges of
IoT environment for the corporate cybersecurity from the legal perspective with regards to the specific
role of small and medium enterprises. It provides an introduction into the environment of SMEs and the
transformation of their operations through new technologies, followed by highlights of the cybersecurity
challenges brought by the IoT. Core part of the contribution is an analysis of the applicable legal frame-
works and discussion of the broader picture with regard to this specific perspective on the regulation of
corporate cybersecurity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to imagine doing business in the modern EU economy without the involve-
ment of ICT technology and the internet connection. At the same time, the modernisation
continues on a relentless pace, bringing to the markets countless new products and solu-
tions. More and more devices contain communication modules that connect them to the
internet or similar network. These products are widely referred to as the Internet of Things
(“IoT”), a growing mesh of interconnected cyber-physical artefacts that bring the society
closer to omnipresent digitalisation. 
The growing importance of cybersecurity measures in face of these technological
changes draws a lot of attention, particularly from three perspectives; the customers’ per-
spective focused on the issues of privacy, data protection and safety; the producers’ per-
spective focused on the issues of liability and standardization; and the state perspective
focused on the national defence and cybercrime suppression. Rather under-researched
remains the particular position of the small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”), despite
their often unique role with regard to this technological transformation. Many SMEs are
positioned in between the above mentioned perspectives, representing small-size corpo-
rate customers that have often similar position to the individuals; producers with uncom-
plicated operations and limited capacities; and subjects to the state cybersecurity strategy
that may not be regarded as critical components individually, but which represent crucial
assets, if perceived as a group.
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The focus of this contribution is to examine the challenges of IoT environment for the
corporate cybersecurity from the legal perspective with regards to the specific role of
SMEs, to subsequently identify possible issues that need to be addressed and to discuss
their specifics.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an introduction into the envi-
ronment of SMEs and the transformation of their operations through new technologies.
Section 3 highlights the cybersecurity challenge brought by the IoT. Section 4 analyses the
applicable legal frameworks that are relevant to this setting. Section 5 then briefly dis-
cusses the broader picture of the SME cybersecurity challenge.
II. SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
II. 1 Definition of a Small or Medium Enterprise
The SMEs are regarded as statistically and legally important category of enterprises2
that should be perceived and approached in specific way in order to accommodate for
their differences from large enterprises, holdings and other economic entities. These dif-
ferences reflect primarily the limited resources that these enterprises operate with. The
category covers diverse businesses that together build up the core of market economies,
accounting for majority of employment, innovation and economic interaction. According
to the statistics of European Commission, SMEs in Europe accounted in 2015 for 99.8%
of all enterprises, 57.4% of value added, and 66.8 % of employment in the non-financial
business sector.3
Small and medium-sized enterprises were defined for the purposes of unified inter-
pretation of the European law in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC con-
cerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The indicators of
an SME are the “staff headcount criterion”4 and “financial criterion”.5 There are three
subcategories; a medium-sized enterprise employs fewer than 250 persons and has si-
multaneously an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual bal-
ance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million.6 A small enterprise then counts fewer
than 50 employees and an annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total with less
than EUR 10 million.7 Finally, enterprises, which employ fewer than 10 persons and
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 mil-
lion, are categorized as microenterprises.8 For the purpose of better contextual percep-
2 “An enterprise is considered to be any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form. This in-
cludes, in particular, self-employed persons and family businesses engaged in craft or other activities, and part-
nerships or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity.” Art. 1 of the Annex to the Commission
Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 
3 MULLER, P., et al. Annual Report on European SMEs 2015 / 2016. In: European Union [online]. 2016 [2017-09-
27]. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/annual_report_-_eu_smes_2015-16.pdf>, p. 8.
4 Recital 4 Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
5 Ibid.
6 Art. 2(1) of the Annex to the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
7 Art. 2(2) of the Annex to the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
8 Art. 2(3) of the Annex to the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
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tion of the subsequent paragraphs, please keep in mind, that according to the above
mentioned statistic, around 90 % of all European enterprises in the non–financial sec-
tors are microenterprises with less than 10 employees.9 Furthermore, large part of the
innovative potential of an economy comes from the start-ups that count among these
microenterprises.
To talk about SMEs means to talk about countless unique business settings that
include the smallest two-person start-ups as well as established medium enterprises
with complex corporate structure. Simultaneously, the role of digitalisation in the 
operations of SMEs is very diverse, reflecting many new emerging business models.
In a sense the SMEs play a uniquely dichotomic role in the face of modernization, 
as the category includes the most progressive and innovative start-ups and pioneers
of digital economy, as well as many very static entities, that stick to the traditio-
nal business models and are oblivious to or purposely rejecting the new techno-
logies.
The aim of this article is to discuss cyber security issues related to doing business
as a SME in the era of IoT. There are apparent limits to the aggregate use of the term
SME in this context. The discussed features of ICT technologies are not relevant 
for all entities that fall under this category. However, a search for more fitting catego-
rization is probably futile, given that the determining characteristics are related 
to multiple properties of the given enterprise, particularly the dependence of its busi-
ness operation on ICT, branch and location of operations, or use of connected devices
in the business operations. The point is that in the end, situation of every business
entity is specific. Nevertheless, given that the category of SMEs is repeatedly used 
as framework of reference in the legislation, policy papers and academic literature
relevant to the topic of this contribution, the term is similarly employed in the fol-
lowing text.
II. 2. Modern Trends, Digital Workplace and the Time of IoT
With full knowledge of these limits of the general SME categorization to any abstraction
from micro to macro perspective of the aggregate tendencies among the SMEs, as well as
differences between the member states of the EU, there seems to be strong general trend
towards modernisation, innovation and digitalisation of the SME operations throughout
the EU.10
These trends are closely linked to shifts towards greater connectivity, interoperability
and inter-dependence as well as adaptability, customization and just-in-time logistics.
The role of the ICT in these shifts is pivotal, as they result from the commercialization of
the internet network and its relentless development and expansion. The digitalisation of
9 MULLER, P. et al. Annual Report on European SMEs 2015 / 2016. p. 6.
10 The Commission’s Europe’s Digital Progress Report 2017 provides a summary snapshot of digitalisation deve-
lopment in EU businesses. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Integration of Digital Technology. In: Europe’s Digital
Progress Report 2017 [online].  2017 [2017-12-02]. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
news/europes-digital-progress-report-2017>, slides 6 and 7.
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the market economy revolves around data processing and transfer.11 Business operations
involve the broadest possible variety of data, ranging from technical metadata, through
business confidential or protected data12 to personal data.13 These data form the basis of
information assets, which are increasingly essential for the functions of an enterprise.
It is becoming strongly apparent that the current state of the digital economy is merely
an intermediate stage on a way towards a state of greater omnipresent connectivity and
digital data-driven economy. The role of the ICT grows through introduction of numerous
new ideas and concepts, ranging from the cloud storage to machine learning or big data
analysis. The stream of new inventions and products is overwhelming and highly hetero-
geneous. One large group that enjoys increasing attention is the loosely defined category
of Internet of Things.
II. 3 Internet of Things
The Internet of Things is a popular term for what remains a challenging concept to
be satisfyingly defined. Furthermore, a variety of other terms are often used in similar
context, particularly “cyber-physical systems”14, “ubiquitous computing”15, “ambient
intelligence”16 or “eObjects”17. A comprehensive study of the available definitions of IoT
by IEEE18 conveys the diversity that indicates a frequent bias towards specific aspects
meant to be emphasized.19 The IEEE distilled from these two neutral definitions. From
a perspective of small environment with low complexity; “[a]n IoT is a network that
connects uniquely identifiable ‘Things’ to the Internet. The ‘Things’ have sensing/actua-
tion and potential programmability capabilities. Through the exploitation of unique
11 Vice-President of the European Commission Andrus Ansip in his speech at Bruegel annual meeting pointed
out that: “If I had to express my views about the digital future – that of Europe or indeed, of the whole world - I
could do it with one word: data. The digital economy revolves around data. It is the driving force behind those
three main elements of productivity, innovation and digitalisation.” See ANSIP, Andrus. Speech by Vice-President
Ansip at Bruegel annual meeting: “Productivity, innovation and digitalisation - which global policy challenges?”
In: European Commission [online].  9.7.2015 [2017-12-02]. Available at:
    <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/ansip/announcements/speech-vice-presid-
ent-ansip-bruegel-annual-meeting-productivity-innovation-and-digitalisation-which_en>.
12 E.g. financial data, strategic documents, intellectual property or business know-how.
13 According to Art. 4(1) GDPR: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable na-
tural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity
of that natural person.
14 MINERVA, R., BIRU, A., ROTONDI, D. Towards a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT). In: IEEE [online].
2015 [2017-12-01]. Available at: <http://iot.ieee.org/definition.html>, p. 71.
15 See WEISER, M. The computer in the 21st century. Scientific American. 1991, Vol. 265, No. 3. 
16 INFORMATION SOCIETY. IST Advisory Group Strategic orientations and priorities for IST in FP6. In: European
Commission [online].  2002 [2017-12-02]. Available at:
    <http://cordis.europa.eu/pub/ist/docs/istag_kk4402456encfull.pdf>, p. 9.
17 MANWARING, K., CLARKE, R. Surfing the Third Wave of Computing: A Framework for Research into eObjects.
Computer Law & Security Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice. 2015, Vol. 31, No.
5, [2017-12-02]. Available at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364915001144>, p. 598.
18 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
19 MINERVA, R., BIRU, A., ROTONDI, D. Towards a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT), p. 70.
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identification and sensing, information about the ‘Thing’ can be collected and the state
of the ‘Things’ can be changed from anywhere, anytime, by anything.”20 This description
is focused on the capacities of a specific device or artefact and its features added
through the connectivity. The large environment scenario definition offers a broader
picture: “Internet of Things envisions a self-configuring, adaptive, complex network that
interconnects ‘things’ to the Internet through the use of standard communication proto-
cols. The interconnected things have physical or virtual representation in the digital
world, sensing/actuation capability, a programmability feature and are uniquely iden-
tifiable. The representation contains information including the thing’s identity, status,
location or any other business, social or privately relevant information. The things offer
services, with or without human intervention, through the exploitation of unique iden-
tification, data capture and communication, and actuation capability. The service is ex-
ploited through the use of intelligent interfaces and is made available anywhere,
anytime, and for anything taking security into consideration.”21 It is particularly this
definition that is relevant to the perception of IoT in business environment and with
regard to cybersecurity. 
IoT covers a broad spectrum of technological solutions adopted in industrial produc-
tion, logistics, resource management, retail and beyond.22 It spans sectors and segments
from healthcare, energy distribution, or infrastructure to numerous private consumer uses
in safety, convenience and entertainment areas.23 The implementation into production
and the consequent transformation of business operations is often labelled as “Industry
4.0”.24
The boom of this multi-product category is intertwined with the broader trends towards
digitalisation of economy,25 enhancing or supporting broader adoption of other new tech-
nologies. Among the existing devices numerous feature cloud storage and computing,
machine-to-machine communication, robotic automation, algorithmic machine learn-
ing, profiling and big data mining or other particular new technologies.26
20 MINERVA, R., BIRU, A., ROTONDI, D. Towards a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT), p. 74.
21 Ibid. 
22 For some specific examples of industrial application see e.g. MERCER, C. Internet of things examples: 14 
best uses of IoT in the enterprise. In: ComputerworldUK [online]. 27. 6. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
<https://www.computerworlduk.com/galleries/cloud-computing/internet-of-things-best-business-enterprise-
offerings-3626973/>, or LIBELIUM. 50 Sensor Applications for a Smarter World. In: Libelium [online]. 2017
[2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://www.libelium.com/resources/top_50_iot_sensor_applications_ranking/>.
23 For more detailed overview of the main areas of application see BEECHAM RESEARCH LTD. M2M Sector Map.
In: Beecham Research Shaping the IoT Future [online]. 2011 [2017-12-02]. Available at: <http://www.beecham-
research.com/download.aspx?id=18>.
24 This term is employed particularly in Germany. See PLATFORM INDUSTRIE 4.0. IT-Security in der Industrie
4.0 Handlungsfelder für Betreiber. In: Bundesministerium für Wirschaft und Energie [online]. 2016 [2017-10-
01]. Available at: <http://www.plattform-i40.de/I40/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Publikation/leitfaden-it-secu-
rity-i40.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6>.
25 For current progress in various segments see the aforementioned EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Integration of
Digital Technology.
26 Various attributes of IoT summarized e.g. MANWARING, K., CLARKE, R. Surfing the Third Wave of Computing:
A Framework for Research into eObjects, pp. 599–601. See also MINERVA, R., BIRU, A., ROTONDI, D. Towards 
a definition of the Internet of Things (IoT), p. 41 et seq.
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If connectivity is defining aspect of this new technology, then its core revolves around
sharing and processing of immense amounts of data relevant to the enterprise, user or
situation. The IoT devices not only operate with the available corporate, technical and
personal data, but to a large degree create additional data inputs that may directly or in-
directly conceal valuable corporate or personal information.27 Ceaseless connectivity also
means intensive and varied interaction with the corporate networks, urging for more flex-
ible network architecture. This in consequence complicates corporate network traffic
oversight and brings new challenges to cyber security design.28
Enterprises of various sizes come as key players in the IoT era of transformation; they take
up the roles of developers, producers, distributors, promoters, as well as customers.29 The field
of industrial IoT is growing rapidly,30 as the implementations lead to increases in efficiency,
productivity, precision or to optimization of costs.31 The early adoption of large scale IoT cor-
porate solutions will probably be pioneered by the large enterprises. There are, however, many
situations, when many the SMEs are likely to soon get in close interaction with IoT devices.
II. 4 IoT in the Corporate Networks of the SMEs
It is difficult to predict the final outcome of the trend towards higher digital connectivity
in different sectors of the economy, yet it is reasonable to expect that the unavoidable de-
velopment of the business environment through market forces will eventually lead to an
extensive transformation of the traditional business models. This process is already well
underway and it seems unlikely that the majority of SMEs will be able to do business as
usual without joining this trend.
The digitalisation of the business environment, as well as gradual introduction of IoT
in the last decade, lead to a lot of buzz and activity on the part of European, national as
well as commercial institutions and initiatives. Collaboration associations, support pro-
grams, innovation workshops, financing projects, conferences and numerous other ac-
tivities surround this trend and navigate its course. There are many new business ventures,
start-up projects and research initiatives that fuel the process through implementation of
IoT components in their business operations or their products and propagation.32 The in-
27 E.g. MARAS, M. Tomorrow’s Privacy. Internet of Things: security and privacy implications. International Data
Privacy Law. 2015, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 100.
28 E.g. PLATFORM INDUSTRIE 4.0. IT-Security in der Industrie 4.0 Handlungsfelder für Betreiber, p. 6–7.
29 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. Industrial Internet of Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products
and Services. In: World Economic Forum [online]. 2015 [2017-12-10]. Available at:
     <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFUSA_IndustrialInternet_Report2015.pdf>, p. 14 et seq.
30 COLUMBUS, L. Roundup Of Internet Of Things Forecasts And Market Estimates, 2016. In: Forbes [online]. 2016.
[2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016/11/27/roundup-of-internet-
of-things-forecasts-and-market-estimates-2016/#7f4b526c292d>.
31 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM. Industrial Internet of Things: Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products
and Services, p. 3.
32 E.g. the European Commission created a dedicated Focus Area on IoT a part of its Work Programme 2016-17
under Horizon 2020 aimed at large-scale IoT pilot projects in various areas. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION.
Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016-2017: Internet Of Things Large Scale Pilots. In: Digital Single Market [on-
line]. 2015 [2017-12-02]. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/horizon-2020-
work-programme-2016-2017-internet-things-large-scale-pilots>.
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novative SMEs are seen as a crucial component of the development of Digital single mar-
ket and the European Union provides various funding instrument for these entities.33
These pioneer SMEs are at the forefront of the transformation and they need to actively
surpass the dangers of new forms of digital connectivity. However, even if a SME does not
directly invest into an introduction of the IoT devices to its business operations, there are
numerous indirect ways that may make this trend relevant for that given enterprise. Aside
from the adoption of new systems and frameworks by the suppliers, customers and other
business partners of the enterprise, the actions and requirements of the employees are
likely to eventually bring the IoT devices into relevance for many corporate networks of
any size. 
The corporate BYOD (Bring-Your-Own-Device) policies are already considerably spread
and with the increasing dependence of individuals on their personalized devices, the de-
mand towards open BYOD policies by employees are likely only to increase.34 Given the
boost it offers to productivity and employee loyalty,35 this type of policy is here to stay and
specific security issues related to its implementation need to be considered.36 It is partic-
ularly the SME business environment, where the BYOD approach could stay prevalent.
This assumption is based on two arguments. Firstly, the SMEs, particularly the smallest,
tend to have difficulties with clearly setting apart the private and corporate data handled
by the employees or owners.37 Secondly, the open BYOD policies allow for taking advantage
of new technologies without additional investment into the corporate equipment. This
form of expense savings can be relevant in enterprises with very limited budget, also par-
ticularly the microenterprises. 
The assumption therefore goes that the corporate networks of many SMEs are in not
so distant future likely to integrate or interact with multiplicity of IoT devices. One of the
eventual impacts of this transformation will be the further increasing importance of data
management and data security for the business operations of the enterprise. 
33 For more see e.g. EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Accelerating innovation in Europe: Horizon 2020 SME Instrument
impact report. In: European Commission [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <https://ec.europa.eu/easme/sites/easme-site/files/accelerating_innovation_in_europe_horizon_2020_
smei_impact_report.pdf>.
34 ZAHADAT, N. et al. BYOD security engineering: A framework and its analysis. Computers & Security. 2015, 
Vol. 55, [2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404815000978>.
35 Based on the data gathered in a questionnaire among employees by the Economist 45% of them did believe
that mobility makes them more productive and 30% would not work for a company, which does not allow BYOD.
See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT. Mobility, performance and engagement. In: The Economist [online].
27. 4. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/technology-innovation/
mobility-performance-and-engagement/white-paper/mobility-performance-and-engagement>.
36 For detailed analysis of security issues related to BYOD policy see ZAHADAT, N. et al. BYOD security engineering:
A framework and its analysis. 
37 CLARKE, R. The prospects of easier security for small organisations and consumers. Computer Law & Security
Review. 2015, Vol. 31, No. 4, [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364915000849>, p. 539; or SANGANI, N. K., VIJAYA-
KUMAR, B. Cyber Security Scenarios and Control for Small and Medium Enterprises. Informatica Economica.
2012, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 59.
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III. THE DARK SIDE OF THE CONNECTIVITY
The dependence of the economy on connectivity and data processing has also its
dark side. News about security vulnerabilities being exposed and large datasets being
breached became unfortunately something of everyday news.38 Available data from the
first half of 2017 signal further massive increase in the number of detected data
breaches39 and particularly in the amount of records stolen or lost.40 If Weber noted that
year 2014 and 2015 were referred to as Year of the Breach and Year of the Breach 2.0.,41
then the trend sadly goes on and it goes strong. The picture painted by available reports
is, however, likely to be still significantly understating the size of the real problem. There
are clearly more events going unreported,42 particularly small size incidents typical 
for SMEs. 
The “price tag” put on cybercrime by McAfee in 2014 was around $400 billion in an-
nual costs.43 Even if these estimates were described as greatly approximate and based
on incomplete information about intangible assets,44 they paint a picture of a massive
burden. Also, many incidents leading to loss or disclosure of data are not due to external
attack, but often a consequence of accidental data manipulation by insiders or other
inadequate data management settings,45 and do not thereby count as cybercrime. These
internal threats are often understated,46 which further manifests the gravity of the need
for adequate cyber security management in many entities. 
III. 1 Cybersecurity
The area of expertise dealing with these threats is commonly termed cybersecurity.
Because of the complexity of the issue, variability of settings and fast pace of change,
it takes many forms. Currently no generally accepted definition of this discipline ex-
38 A sobering detailed statistics about data breaches assorted by year, industry, location or size are available at
GEMALTO. Data Breach Statistics by Year, Industry, More. In: Breach Level Index [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09].
Available at: <http://breachlevelindex.com>.
39 Gemalto identified 918 data breaches worldwide, compared with 815 in the last six months of 2016. See GE-
MALTO. 2017 Poor Internal Security Practices Take a Toll. In: Breach Level Index [online]. 2017 [2017-09-17].
Available at: <http://breachlevelindex.com/assets/Breach-Level-Index-Report-H1-2017-Gemalto.pdf>, p. 3.
40 The same report states that some 1.9 billion data records were lost or stolen during the first half of 2017, com-
pared with mere 721 million during the previous six months, giving an increase of 164%. See GEMALTO. 2017
Poor Internal Security Practices Take a Toll.
41 WEBER, R. H. Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things: Legal aspects. Computer Law & Security Review. 2016,
Vol. 2016, No. 32, p. 715.
42 The following study gives thorough insight into the size of the possible unreported part of data breaches. See
BISOGNI, F., ASGHARI, H., VAN EETEN, M. J.G. Estimating the size of the iceberg from its tip. In: 16th Annual
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security: WEIS 2017. San Diego: University of California. 
43 MCAFEE. Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime. In: McAfee [online]. 2014 [2017-12-09]. Available
at: <https://www.mcafee.com/de/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf>, p. 2.
44 For more thorough description of the limits of any such valuation see BREWSTER, Tom. Is the global cost 
of cybercrime really £266bn a year? No, it isn’t. In: The Guardian [online]. 2014 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/09/global-cost-of-cybercrime-266bn>. 
45 GEMALTO. 2017 Poor Internal Security Practices Take a Toll, p. 4.
46 For a detailed guide through many traditional cybersecurity misconceptions see CRUME, J. Inside Internet 
Security: What Hackers Don’t Want You To Know. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2000. 
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ists.47 Herr and Friedman openly claim that “[c]ybersecurity is an often abused and much
misused term that was once intended to describe and now serves better to confuse.”48
Anderson on his blog recently stated: “My talk started off from Ame Elliott’s argument
yesterday that “cybersecurity” is an unhelpful and indeed militaristic reframing of what we
do. This resonates with the last 25 years of my life through the crypto wars, the birth of se-
curity economics and my book on security engineering.”49 Anderson prefers to use the term
security engineering, a cross-disciplinary endeavour towards building resilient and de-
pendable ICT systems, to describe the actions needed to protect from malicious or acci-
dental cybernetic incidents.50
If we accept the limitation of the term cybersecurity and the problematic connotation it may
have in some settings, a working definition for the purpose of this paper can be borrowed from
ITU: “Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guide-
lines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets.”51 The term
“assets” in this context includes hardware, software, networks, data, personnel or other parts
of the entity’s internal networks and operations.52 The aim of cybersecurity is to protect func-
tions and functioning of the system. This is also commonly described by the “CIA triad” of se-
curity objectives; (i) confidentiality, (ii) integrity and (iii) availability.53
III. 2 Cybersecurity Threats to Corporate Networks
The spectrum of potential vulnerability vectors that may affect the business through
its corporate network is broad and continuously increasing. For the purpose of a general
overview, an illustrative system of three threat targets was adopted for this article.54 These
categories do not encompass fully all potential threats and may also overlay in some cases;
however, they allow better perception of the specific roles of the SMEs in the overall cy-
bersecurity landscape.
47 SILVA, K. Europe’s fragmented approach towards cybersecurity. Internet Policy Review. 2015, Vol. 2, No. 4, [2017-
12-09]. Available at: <http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/europes-fragmented-approach-towards-cyber-
security>. 
48 HERR, T., FRIEDMAN, A. Redefining Cybersecurity: The American Foreign Policy Council Defense Technology
Program Brief. In: American Foreign Policy Council [online]. [2017-12-09]. Available at: 
    <http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewPolicyPaper/266413>.
49 ANDERSON, R. Security and Human Behaviour 2017. In: Light Blue Touchpaper: Security Reseach, Computer
Laboratory, University of Cambridge [online]. 25. 5. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://www.lightblue-
touchpaper.org/2017/05/25/security-and-human-behaviour-2017/>.
50 ANDERSON, R. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. 2nd edition Indiana-
polis: Wiley Publishing, 2008. p. 3.
51 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION. Definition of cybersecurity. In: ITU [online] [2017-12-06].
Available at: <http://www.itu.int:80/en/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/Pages/cybersecurity.aspx>.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 The systematics is based on the threat target identifier adopted by the unit of Cyber Security Assessment Ne-
therlands. See VAN DER MEULEN, N., A JO, E., SOESANTO, S. Cybersecurity in the European Union and Beyond:
Exploring the Threats and Policy Responses. In: Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European
Parliament [online]. 2015 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536470/IPOL_STU(2015)536470_EN.pdf>, p. 30.
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First category can be described as the threats affecting primarily the customers or in-
dividuals of the targeted entity. These interventions include all forms of data breach, prod-
uct malfunction or service downtime.55 SMEs have access to and process various volumes
and scopes of personal data. The operations may be limited to data of few individuals,
particularly the owners or employees, and the potential threat of unauthorized access to
these data may present a limited risk to the affected individuals. Occasionally, however,
a company may operate with large databanks about countless individuals or process
highly sensitive data.56 The SME may also have authorization and access to databases or
networks managed by larger entities and their network may therefore serve as an access
point to otherwise well protected systems.57
The second type of threats covers those being aimed at the corporations as producers
or economic entities. The spectrum of manifestations encompasses the corporate espi-
onage,58 theft of intellectual property,59 malicious interruption of business operations,60
ransomware61 and other malware aimed at financial gain, or various forms of social engi-
neering attacks.62 Similarly as with access to personal data databases, the authorizations
and access of SME in the role of suppliers makes them potential gateway into the corpo-
55 A data breach primarily affects the privacy and virtual identity of the data subject, putting them at risk of unau-
thorized profiling or identity theft. Similarly, a malfunction presents a threat of injury or damage to property of
the user. Service downtime can be largely problematic e.g. by logistics, administration tools, medical equipment
or other dependable analytic systems.
56 Various professionals or small enterprises operate with highly sensitive data, e.g. lawyers, doctors, accountants,
testing or research labs.
57 Popular example is the hack of Target through HVAC Company. See KREBS, B. Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC
Company — Krebs on Security. In: Krebs on Security [online]. 2. 5. 2014 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://kreb-
sonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company>.
58 See e.g. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE. Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Arrest Of
Macau Resident And Unsealing Of Charges Against Three Individuals For Insider Trading Based On Information
Hacked From Prominent U.S. Law Firms. In: Southern District of New York [online]. 27. 12. 2016 [2017-12-09].
Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-arrest-macau-resi-
dent-and-unsealing-charges-against>.
59 GRIFFIN, A. HBO hack behind Game of Thrones season 7 script leak is a sign of things to come, warn cyber se-
curity experts. In: The Independent [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at: 
     <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/hbo-hack-game-thrones-season-7-script-
leak-cyber-security-experts-got-spoilers-media-tv-series-a7871086.html>. 
60 A prime example is the recent massive “wiper” attack dubbed NotPetya. This malware encrypted data, but did
not allow a way to recover them. See TECHNOLOGY. Cyber-attack “about data not money”. In: BBC News [on-
line]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40442578>. 
61 Ransomware stands for malware that encrypts valuable data and requires ransom for the decryption key.
This type of malicious activity became recently massively widespread. Media attention was grabbed parti-
cularly by the WannaCry ransomware peaking in May 2017. See TECHNOLOGY. Massive cyber-attack hits
99 countries. In: BBC News [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/techno-
logy-39901382>.  
62 Social engineering is particularly effective form of illicit cyber activity. It relies on the manipulation of the
personnel into disclosure of sensitive information or opening the network to vulnerability. It takes many
forms that range from simple phishing email to complex tailor-made scam scenarios. See e.g. HADNAGY,
C. Social engineering The Art of Human Hacking. Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing, 2011; or MOUTON, F., LE-
ENEN, L., VENTER, H. S. Social engineering attack examples, templates and scenarios. Computers & Security.
2016, Vol. 59, [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404816300268>. 
FRANTIŠEK KASL                                                                                                    165–188
174 www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq   | TLQ  2/2018
rate networks of large enterprises.63 At the same time, the SMEs themselves do possess as-
sets that make them interesting targets for malicious attacks. The SMEs may be less threat-
ened by targeted tailor-made hacking, but nonetheless face a growing avalanche of mass
distributed malware and spam, particularly ransomware or social engineering attacks. 
The last category encompasses threats that are relevant from the national security per-
spective.64 This is mainly the case, if the network devices become enslaved in malicious
botnet,65 which can then accumulate the joined capacity of the swarm of devices for var-
ious nefarious purposes.66 These include, but are not limited to DDoS attacks on high pro-
file targets or critical infrastructure, distribution of malware or spam, or storage space for
illegal content.67 If numerous SMEs become likely target for botnet building malware, the
aggregate capacity of this network is likely to become subject of interest for the national
cybersecurity units.68
Malware that does not manifest its presence to the user (like e.g. ransomware does)
is more likely to stay undisturbed and effective and multiple devices in corporate net-
work of the SME make one successful infection easily distributable throughout the local
network, increasing the effectivity of the attack. The SMEs represent a large category
of economic entities with limited capacity for cybersecurity investment and generally
lower awareness to cybersecurity threats. Data breach detection is difficult even in large
entities and the usual time to identify such an incident is measured in months after its
occurrence.69 If we consider, that detection of any stealthy incident is unlikely without
advanced cybersecurity tools, which the SME usually do not possess, there are possibly
many SME networks infected by various forms of malware or botnet command without
knowledge.
63 The supply chain cybersecurity plays an increasing role in the interconnected and interdependent economy.
Numerous cyber incidents by large entities originate through weak protection in their supply chain, often by
SMEs. For more see e.g. PURDY, A. The Global Cyber Security Challenge: It is time for real progress in addressing
supply chain risks. In: Huawei Technologies [online]. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at <http://www-file.huawei.
com/~/media/CORPORATE/PDF/cyber-security/the-global-cyber-security-challenge-en.pdf?la=en>; SHAC-
KLEFORD, D. Combatting Cyber Risks in the Supply Chain. In: SANS Institute [online]. [2017-12-09]. Available
at: <https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/combatting-cyber-risks-supply-chain-36252>.
64 Such threats endanger the availability, integrity or confidentiality of essential services, critical infrastructure,
national security facilities, public safety, order or legal and democratic functions of the government. Most states
formulate their national cyber security strategy, international cooperation is, however, simultaneously pursued,
particularly within NATO. See NATO. Cyber defence. In: NATO [online]. 8. 7. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm>.
65 Botnet stands for robot network, meaning a network of devices that become controlled from a remote command
& control server, usually without direct knowledge of the owner and user of such a device.
66 Prime example is the 2016 massive DDoS attack using the Mirai botnet of IoT devices. See WOOLF, N. DDoS at-
tack that disrupted internet was largest of its kind in history, experts say. In: The Guardian [online]. 2016 [2017-
12-09]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet>. 
67 CENTRO NAZIONALE ANTIBOTNET. What botnets are. In: Centro Nationale Antibotnet [online]. [2017-12-09].
Available at: <http://www.antibot.it/en/content/what-botnets-are>.
68 This was the case in aforementioned Mirai botnet. See eg BRACY, J. Why securing IoT is a national-security im-
perative. In: The International Association of Privacy Professionals [online]. 24. 10. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available
at: <https://iapp.org/news/a/why-securing-iot-is-a-national-security-imperative/>.
69 A mean time to identify a data breach was by Ponemon at 201 days in 2016. See PONEMON INSTITUTE. 2016
Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis. In: IBM [online]. 6. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://www-
01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=sel03094wwen>, p. 23.
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III. 3 SMEs as Victims of Cybercrime
There are currently large limits to statistical assessment of corporate cybercrime or cy-
bersecurity in any given area, particularly with regard to SMEs. Nonetheless, as already
indicated in beginning of this section, the current trends in cybercrime are overwhelm-
ingly towards continuous increase in its frequency, sophistication, impact as well as scope.
In this regard, many of the SMEs present intersection of parameters that make them into
highly likely target of cybercrime. It is because they on one hand operate similarly as the
large entities with databases of valuable data, but also because breach of their network
may provide authorization or access throughout the supply chain to corporate networks
of more valuable targets. Furthermore, they are also usually more likely to possess ade-
quate financial assets to be stolen or extorted as ransom than individual users. In general,
the fact that SME networks are corporate networks, which usually comprise of multiple
devices and may offer access to larger volumes of data and more valuable assets than in
case of an individual, makes these networks into valuable targets for cybercrime.
On the other hand, the SME usually suffer from disadvantages that are close to the in-
dividual users. It is neither surprising nor revealing that the SME dispose of limited re-
sources and insufficient awareness of cybersecurity.70 Beside the limited awareness or
budget, additional cause may lay in low priority of cybersecurity in comparison to other
regulatory burdens and compliance obligations that are more directly linked to doing
business as such. Particularly micro enterprises have tendency to practice the approach
of “security by obscurity”,71 assuming that their assets are sufficiently insignificant to be
a target or simply playing the expected odds of being one of many. 
The SME corporate network can suffer from various flaws. It may depend on outdated
or ineffective monitoring or cybersecurity tools. It may be subject to lenient BYOD policy
that allows compromised devices to be connected without proper control.72 There may
lack education or organisation of the employees, who remain unaware of the threats and
uninformed about the proper behaviour to mitigate the risks.73 All this greatly increases
the probability of undetected vulnerability, limits the capacity for timely fix and increases
the potential damage. The SMEs are at the same time often highly dependent on the net-
worked devices or software services they use in their business operations, thereby in-
creased risk of malfunction or unavailability of these components increases the risk of
business interruption, which may pose existential threat to the SME.
70 Clarke puts it as follows: “Many other organisations, however, despite having considerable dependence on infor-
mation and IT, have at best a hazy understanding of IT security.” See CLARKE, Roger. The prospects of easier se-
curity for small organisations and consumers. p. 538.
71 Strategy based on the assumed low priority or probability of becoming a target of a malicious attack.
72 WHITWELL, J. Small businesses should invest in cyber security. In: The Telegraph [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09].
Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/open-economy/small-businesses-should-invest-in-cyber-
security/>.
73 This applies particularly to password and communication management and emergency procedure in case of
security breach or social engineering scam. See e.g. NIXON, S. Are you an easy hacking target? Cybersecurity
tips for small business. In: The Guardian [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <http://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2017/sep/08/are-you-an-easy-hacking-target-cyber-
security-tips-for-small-business>.
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Recent cybersecurity breach survey from the UK74 provides data to further support
above mentioned claims or assumptions. Median annual expenses on cybersecurity by
small and micro enterprises were found to be only GBP 200.75 More tellingly, 39% of small
and micro enterprises had no governance or risk management measures implemented,
as they considered themselves too small or insignificant.76 45% of the small and micro
businesses reported data breach in last 12 months.77 The study identified higher incidence
rate among entities that were taking active action towards their cybersecurity, possibly in-
dicating, that those without adequate measures might have simply not identified the fact
that their networks were breached.78
This very simplified insight into the broad spectrum of traditional attack vectors and
their effect on SMEs should underlay two assertions. Firstly, that the SME corporate net-
work is a valuable and frequent target for malicious activities, as it provides access to the
data within this network, capacity of the devices in this network that may be used for at-
tacks on third party as well as potential gateway to more valuable, but better protected
assets. Conclusion to be drawn from this assertion is that the importance of SME cyber-
security should not be underestimated. The second assertion is that majority of modern
cybersecurity threats fall under the ‘simple large-scale high-frequency automated attacks’
rather than ‘complex targeted interventions with specific goal in mind’. The preference of
scale operations and exploiting of known vulnerabilities, or deceit of a human, rather than
sophisticated hacking, is sufficiently documented.79 Large portion of the cyberattacks is
distributed through mass use of time-proven simple tools and tactics,80 among which
count various forms of malware or ransomware delivered through social engineering
tricks as well as botnet DDoS attacks. This, however, means that most targets of cyberat-
tacks are not being selected, but simply caught in widely cast net, therefore “security by
obscurity” approach cannot work and high number of SMEs simply means high number
of vulnerable targets. Mass incorporation of IoT devices into weakly secured SME corpo-
rate networks could therefore prove to be the looming cybersecurity “perfect storm”.81
74 KLAHR, R. et al. Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017. In: UK Department for Culture, Media & Sport [online].
2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/609186/Cyber_Security_
Breaches_Survey_2017_main_report_PUBLIC.pdf>.
75 The value was certainly affected by a fact that 34% of the 829 surveyed micro enterprises reported GBP 0 ex-
penses on cyber security. Also for this fact is the mean value more illustrative than the median, which is GBP
2,600. See KLAHR, R. et al. Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017, p. 21.
76 This is clearly supporting the assumption of widespread “security by obscurity” approach. See KLAHR, R. et al.
Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017, p. 32.
77 The survey further expressly states that: “This highlights that there are firms who may mistakenly think that
cyber security is not relevant to them, but are also susceptible to breaches.” See KLAHR, R. et al. Cyber Security
Breaches Survey 2017, p. 39.
78 KLAHR, R. et al. Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017, p. 40.
79 EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE. The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2016. The Hague: Eu-
ropean Police Office, 2016, p. 8.
80 SYMANTEC. Internet Security Threat Report 2017 Volume 22. In: Symantec [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available
at: <https://www.websecurity.symantec.com/reports-leadgen/istr>, p. 7.
81 In a way, the cybersecurity of IoT can be perceived as “perfect storm” in itself, even without taking into consi-
deration the particular situation of SMEs. See WEBER, R. H. Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things: Legal
aspects. Computer Law & Security Review. 2016, Vol. 2016, No. 32, p. 16.
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III. 4 IoT Devices as Potential ‘Threat Enhancers’
There are substantial concerns that the mass adoption of the IoT devices will lead to
additional spike of cybercrime incidents.82 IoT devices are perceived as ‘threat enhancer’,83
as they increase the complexity of the network interaction, diversify the attack vectors and
represent computing power that may be easy to enthral. 
These devices, linked to the victim networks, may scale up the damage and harm in
three major ways. Firstly, if the hacker assumes control over large numbers of vulnerable
devices, their computing power can largely enhance the DDoS attacks or other illicit ac-
tivities.84 Such ‘weaponized IoT devices’ may cause massive potential damage to third
party victims,85 whereas this risk only increases with higher penetration of IoT devices in
social and economic infrastructures. Secondly, these devices increase the attack surface
of the network and their variety creates in combination new vulnerabilities. The third risk
comes from the data that these devices collect and process.86 The omnipresence of IoT
sensors and increased documentation of all aspects of activities in digital as well as phys-
ical realm through these devices brings new possibilities and features, but also new threats
for privacy, secrecy and intimacy on the human as well as business level. This in turn
makes these data more valuable and their management and protection more crucial.
So far the cyber criminals, despite several serious incidents,87 did not yet fully capitalize
on the potential of the broad adoption of the IoT devices.88 There are, however, numerous
documented vulnerabilities and security design flaw that highlight frequent absence of
adequate security features in IoT devices.89 The security threat is after all highlighted as
the major obstacle to adoption of these devices into corporate networks by the represen-
tatives of SMEs themselves.90
82 SYMANTEC. Internet Security Threat Report 2017 Volume 22, p. 63 et seq; ARBOR NETWORKS. Worldwide In-
frastructure Security Report. In: NETSCOUT [online]. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://www.arbornet-
works.com/images/documents/WISR2016_EN_Web.pdf>, p. 55; or MARINOS, L., BELMONTE, A., REKLEITIS,
E. ENISA Threat Landscape 2015. In: Enisa [online]. 2015 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://www.enisa.eu-
ropa.eu/publications/etl2015>, p. 74 et seq.
83 According to the Europol report is the IoT no longer perceived by the law enforcement as an emerging threat,
but rather as a regular feature in cybercrime investigations. See EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE. The Internet Or-
ganised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2016, p. 52.
84 EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE. The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2016, p. 38.
85 SUTHERHAND, L. The Threat From Weaponized IoT Devices: It’s Bigger Than You Think! In: Security Intelligence
[online]. 20. 7. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://securityintelligence.com/the-threat-from-weaponized-
iot-devices-its-bigger-than-you-think/>.
86 The IoT devices can potentially increase the likelihood or severity of data breaches. See MARAS, M. Tomorrow’s
Privacy. Internet of Things: security and privacy implications. International Data Privacy Law. 2015, Vol. 5, No.
2, p. 101.
87 E.g. the above mentioned Mirai botnet. See SYMANTEC. Internet Security Threat Report 2017 Volume 22, 
pp. 65–67.
88 The Europol is warning about inevitability of novel hybrid threats aimed at IoT infrastructures. EUROPEAN PO-
LICE OFFICE. The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2016, p. 54.
89 E.g. SCHNEIER, B. The Internet of Things Will Turn Large-Scale Hacks into Real World Disasters. In: Schneier on
Security [online]. 25. 7. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
     <https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2016/07/the_internet_of_thin_3.html>.
90 E.g. TREND CONSULTING. Are Europe’s SMEs making the most of the Digital Workplace? In: Aruba [online].
2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://dutchitchannel.nl/563254/rapport-are-europes-smes-making-the-
most-of-the-digital-workplace.pdf>, p. 7.
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None of the observations about the shortcoming of SME cybersecurity and their vulnera-
bility as cybercrime victims are very new. These issues are discussed since the early era of com-
mercial internet. It is, however, the combination of these attributes of SMEs with the trends
towards digital economy, IoT environment and consequential security risks that may result in
strongly negative effects against doing business as SME. With regard to the crucial role of SMEs
as a whole in the structure of market economy and them being the essential agents of innova-
tion, this matter transcends the challenges faced by individual enterprise and becomes signif-
icant from the perspective of cyber security and macroeconomic policies.
IV. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
The matter discussed in this contribution is subject to group of legal frameworks deal-
ing with various aspects that touch upon the obligations of SMEs for secure processing of
data and cybersecurity of their corporate networks. To better illustrate the structure of
obligations, once again the illustrative system of three perspectives is adopted. 
IV. 1 Customers’ Perspective – Personal Data Protection and Safety Regulation
Cybersecurity represents in a way a prerequisite for protection of personal privacy or
personal data. Despite difficult interactions between these frameworks secure devices,
networks and processing are essential for securing privacy or personal data protection.
For this reason, security requirements are an inherent part of the privacy and data pro-
tection frameworks.91
The EU Data protection reform92 currently in process93 is nowadays the most discussed
legislative development affecting the SME cybersecurity. It introduces largely uniform tool
for encouragement of ‘level playing field’ on data processing within the EU.94 The adoption
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)95, E-Privacy Regulation96 as well as other
related European97 and national legislation is aimed at providing high level of protection
91 KUNER, C. et al. Editorial: The rise of cybersecurity and its impact on data protection. International Data Pri-
vacy Law. 2017, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 73.
92 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Reform of EU data protection rules. In: JUSTICE Building European Area of Justice
[online]. [2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm>.
93 The legislation is due to take effect on 25th May 2018.
94 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. How will the EU’s data protection reform strengthen the internal market? In: Eu-
ropean Commission [online]. [2017-12-09]. Available at:
    <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/4_strenghten_2016_en.pdf>.
95 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and re-
pealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
96 Currently in a form of Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the re-
spect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive
2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM/2017/010 final - 2017/03 (COD).
97 Particularly the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the
purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA.
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to the individual’s personal data, their use, processing, distribution and storage. It there-
fore sets adequate requirements on the corporate level technical and organisational data
security measures. The obligations are not a new concept,98 but the SMEs remain chal-
lenged with lack of guidelines for specific interpretation of their obligations.99
With regard to cybersecurity, GDPR is aimed towards a specific objective, the security
of processing of the personal data of the data subjects and protection of their related rights
and freedoms.100 The obligations that arise to the enterprise in its role as data controller
or processor include requirements of adequate technical and organisation measures for
securing the personal data processing.101 Given that personal data processing is in many
cases crucial aspect of the core business operations of the entity, this requirement is likely
to affect the overall security of the entity’s corporate network. The norm follows the risk-
based approach, linking the level of required measures appropriate to the risk to the rights
and freedoms of the affected data subject.102 Adoption of suitable risk assessment method
is therefore an important step towards compliance, albeit identification of such method
is increasingly challenging in face of the transformation brought by the era of IoT.103 The
assessment the data controller or processor has to undertake is multipolar,104 taking fur-
ther into consideration the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as
available technological solutions and costs related to the implementation of the selected
measures.105 It therefore needs to be mindful of the potential impact of data breach and
design its processing operations accordingly in order to adequately prevent unauthorized
or accidental destruction, loss, alteration or disclosure or effectively mitigate consequence
of such situation, e.g. through encryption, pseudonymisation or backup.106 Similar re-
quirements are also manifested through the accents on continuous protection, data min-
imisation and managed limited data accessibility expressed in GDPR as data protection
by design and by default.107
The required actions are not only technical, i.e. control management, authorization,
monitoring or reporting tools, but also organizational. Particularly in prevention of acci-
98 Currently applicable requirements have been set by Article 17 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
99 ENISA. Guidelines for SMEs on the security of personal data processing. 2016, p. 5–6.
100 Art. 1(1,2) and Art. 5(1)(f) GDPR. 
101 Art. 24 and 32 GDPR.
102 Art. 32(1) GDPR.
103 Guidance may be provided by ENISA. Recommendations for a methodology of the assessment of severity of
personal data breaches. In: Enisa [online]. 2013 [2018-02-27]. Available at: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/pu-
blications/dbn-severity> or other frameworks, models and guidelines. For examples see ARTICLE 29 DATA
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY. Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining
whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679. In: European
Commission [online]. 2017 [2018-02-27]. Available at:
      <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=44137>, p. 20.
104 PAAL, B. P. et al. Datenschutz-Grundverordnung: DS-GVO. München: C.H.Beck, 2017. Beck’sche Kompakt-Kom-
mentare. online version. [2017-10-10]. Available in: Beck. Art. 32(B.)(I.) Rn. 26.
105 Art. 32(1) GDPR.
106 Art. 32(1)(a-d) GDPR.
107 Art. 25 GDPR.
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dental cyber incidents or protection against social engineering108 is the aspect of employee
management, education, motivation and communication essential. 
The compliance regime under GDPR is primarily build on the principle of accountabil-
ity,109 requiring the data controller or processor to demonstrate the implemented measures
and their adequacy in relation to the processing operations. The regulation was conceived
with more lenient requirements towards SMEs in mind.110 Despite the derogation in
record-keeping obligations for SMEs,111 the SMEs are advised to keep proper records of
their organizational and technical measures for ensuring the security of personal data
processing and its regular revision.112 SMEs are also not except from the obligation to im-
plement these measures113 or from the newly introduced mandatory data breach notifi-
cation duties.114
The SMEs are in somewhat disadvantaged position to larger entities in their quest to
properly comply with the GDPR requirements, given their limited budgetary, know-how
and particularly personnel assets. For this reason, official guidelines and state sponsored
programs with focus on SMEs are crucial for achieving the purpose of the regulation
among this large segment of diverse enterprises. ENISA released a study providing general
guidance for SMEs to their GDPR related security obligations in December 2016.115 This
document is a needed basic framework for clarification of often ambiguous terms in the
GDPR. It does, however, deal only with the general principles and methods of securing
the personal data processing. The cybersecurity challenges faced by the SMEs are diverse
and more sector and jurisdiction specific guidelines need to follow, to be able to properly
communicate the GDPR framework to the SME recipients. 
The ENISA guidelines touch upon the issue of IoT devices by identifying the capacity
of this technology to further interlink personal data security and underlying corporate
network security.116 The obligations set forward by the data protection framework cannot
be perceived in a vacuum, but need to be systematically connected to other requirements
on overall corporate network security. The Data protection reform should not end up
being perceived by the SMEs as additional administrative burden limiting their capacity
to do business, but as an incentive for broadly needed investment into integrated and ef-
fective cybersecurity measures that cover vulnerable and valuable assets of the company.
108 MOUTON, F., LEENEN, L., VENTER, H. S. Social engineering attack examples, templates and scenarios. p. 207.
109 Art. 24(1) GDPR.
110 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR JUSTICE AND CONSUMERS. EU Data Protection Reform: What benefits 
for businesses in Europe? Fact sheet. In: European Commission [online]. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/factsheets_2016/data-protection-factsheet_
01a_en.pdf>, pp. 5–6.
111 Art. 30(5) GDPR.
112 VAN CANNEYT, T., PROVOOST, S. M. Belgian DPA publishes recommendation on GDPR record keeping obli-
gation. In: Fieldfisher [online]. 7. 4. 2017 [2017-11-11]. Available at:
      <http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2017/belgian-dpa-publishes-recommendation-on-gdpr-record-kee-
ping-obligation/>.
113 ENISA. Guidelines for SMEs on the security of personal data processing. p. 6.
114 Art. 33 and 34 GDPR.
115 ENISA. Guidelines for SMEs on the security of personal data processing. 
116 ENISA. Guidelines for SMEs on the security of personal data processing.  pp. 7–8.
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However, only by highlighting the urgency of the need for transformation of the use of ICT
technology and the benefits for every participating entity and its business model in face
of the expansion of IoT can a timely progress on this front be achieved. 
Additional to the protection of individual’s personal data and privacy does the legal
framework include an established mechanism of legal instruments for her or his safety.117
The rules for product liability apply in case of injury or damage caused by product mal-
function. This regime becomes increasingly relevant due to the rise of IoT devices as cyber-
physical artefacts. Given that the liability for service or intangible goods like software does
not reach the protection in case of tangible products, there is a growing debate concerning
the liability distribution in case of defective IoT device.118
IV. 2 Producers’ Perspective – Sector Specific Regulations
Next to the legal obligations described in the previous section, the enterprises are often
subject to sector-specific regulations.119 Most of the requirements for security of corporate
operations in these regulations are formulated as general performance and risk based
rules. Overall the corporate cybersecurity in various sectors is generally governed on the
self-regulation basis, with each sector or industry adopting guidelines and best practices
for appropriate measures, usually with cybersecurity as secondary or implied component. 
The SMEs are often further bound on the contractual basis through its subcontracting
relationship to larger enterprise, particularly in case of ICT maintenance or administration
services.120 The compliance with these requirements is usually manifested through adher-
ence to recognized standards and technical norms, in case of technical and organisational
cybersecurity measures particularly to the ISO/IEC 2700x family or ISA/IEC 62443.121
117 Product liability directive 85/374/EES, as well as several sector specific frameworks, e.g. directive 2007/46/EC
for motor vehicles or 2007/47/EC concerning medical devices.
118 This issue is highlighted e.g. in EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Commision staff working document: Advancing
the Internet of Things in Europe Accompanying the document Digitising European Industry Reaping the full
benefits of a Digital Single Market {COM(2016) 180 final}. In: EUR-Lex [online]. 19. 4. 2016 [2017-10-01]. Ava-
ilable at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0110&from=EN>, p. 22
and also discussed in the research regarding standardisation and certification of IoT, see LEVERETT, É., CLAY-
TON, R., ANDERSON, R. Standardisation and Certification of the “Internet of Things”. In: WEIS 2017 [online].
2017 [2017-11-11]. Available at: <https://www.conpolicy.de/en/news-detail/standardization-and-certification-
of-the-internet-of-things/>, p. 9-10. For a discussion of product liability in IoT under the US law perspective
see e.g. BUTLER, A. Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: Should Manufacturers Be Liable
for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices? In: SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Ne-
twork [online]. 2017 [2017-11-11]. Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2955317>. 
119 Most economic segments are regulated in some aspect on the European or national level. Sector-specific regu-
lation with relevant general cybersecurity requirements or implications can be found in the field of electronic
communications, media, legal services, accounting, medical services, pharmaceutical industry, financial services,
software, administration of critical or important infrastructure, procurement of public utilities, e-commerce etc. 
120 BACHLECHNER, D. et al. IT-Sicherheit für die Industrie 4.0 Produktion, Produkte, Dienste von morgen im Zei-
chen globalisierter Wertschöpfungsketten Abschlussbericht. In: Bundesministerium für Wirschaft und Energie
[online]. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: 
      <http://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Studien/it-sicherheit-fuer-industrie-4-0.pdf;jsessio-
nid=D0C8D58C4B07532B65334E42E238FFF8?__blob=publicationFile&v=4>, p. 101.
121 BACHLECHNER, D. et al. IT-Sicherheit für die Industrie 4.0 Produktion, Produkte, Dienste von morgen im Zei-
chen globalisierter Wertschöpfungsketten Abschlussbericht, p. 23.
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With the expansion of IoT uses in the business environment, there are considerations
of possible security certification for IoT products.122 The recently presented report by An-
derson, Leverett and Clayton from the research for the European Commission on read-
justment of safety regulation with regard to IoT123 provides a deep insight into
opportunities as well as limitations of regulation and standards setting for this new tech-
nology. A great deal can be adopted from the established practices in the software industry,
particularly the regular vulnerability and penetration testing, following standards like
ISO/IEC 29147 or ISO/IEC 30111.124 There is need for coordinated approach to the collec-
tion and sharing of data about vulnerabilities, in-depth monitoring and coordinated re-
sponse to attacks or malware infections.125 Similar recommendations come from ENISA
with regard to cybersecurity of ICS/SCAD126 systems.127 The need for such recommenda-
tions is bound to the increased connectivity of these previously isolated industrial systems
through the adoption of IoT devices and transformation towards digital economy. 
European Union is actively managing the development of the emerging IoT economy,
particularly through the Large-scale pilots128 and support to industry developed innovative
solutions. It is also monitoring the process by standard developing organisations regarding
IoT and cybersecurity.129 The formulation of adequate security framework for ‘Industry
4.0’ is also pursued by state sponsored research groups130 as well as by business consor-
tia.131 From the perspective of SMEs the self-regulatory business organisations pursuing
122 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Commision staff working document: Advancing the Internet of Things in Europe
Accompanying the document Digitising European Industry Reaping the full benefits of a Digital Single Market
{COM(2016) 180 final}, pp. 30–31. Certification is also promoted by ENISA, see INFINEON – NXP – STMICRO-
ELECTRONICS – ENISA. Common Position On Cybersecurity. In: Enisa [online]. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available
at: < https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-position-papers-and-opinions/infineon-nxp-st-enisa-
position-on-cybersecurity>, p. 2.
123 LEVERETT, É., CLAYTON, R., ANDERSON, R. Standardisation and Certification of the “Internet of Things”. 
124 LEVERETT, É., CLAYTON, R., ANDERSON, R. Standardisation and Certification of the “Internet of Things”. 
pp. 12–14.
125 LEVERETT, É., CLAYTON, R., ANDERSON, R. Standardisation and Certification of the “Internet of Things”, 
pp. 17–18.
126 Industrial Control System/ Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition are terms for industrial level operational
systems and architectures. 
127 ENISA. Communication network dependencies for ICS/SCADA Systems. In: Enisa [online]. 2016 [2017-12-09].
Available at: < https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies>.
128 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016–2017: Internet Of Things Large Scale Pilots.
In: Digital Single Market [online]. 2015 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/horizon-2020-work-programme-2016-2017-internet-things-large-scale-pilots>.
129 CEN, ETSI, IEEE, ISO/IEC, IETF, ITU and other. For detailed report see DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTER-
NAL MARKET, INDUSTRY, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMES. Rolling Plan for ICT Standardisation 2017. In:
European Commission [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
      <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-13/grow_rolling_
plan_ict_2017_web_170302_C7EC62EB-0196-6C12-45229D71D00B0D6B_43894.pdf>, p. 25-32.
130 The already mentioned German study for the Federal Ministry of Economy and Energy is a great example. See
BACHLECHNER, D. et al. IT-Sicherheit für die Industrie 4.0 Produktion, Produkte, Dienste von morgen im Zei-
chen globalisierter Wertschöpfungsketten Abschlussbericht.
131 E.g. the Industrial Internet Consortium that recently published first report on its progress towards common
security framework. See INDUSTRIAL INTERNET CONSORTIUM. Industrial Internet of Things Volume G4: 
Security Framework. In: Industrial Internet Consortium [online]. 26. 9. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
<http://www.iiconsortium.org/IISF.htm>.
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common standards often succumb to the market forces, limiting the influence of SMEs
and neglecting their specific role. This makes state sponsored research with adequate par-
ticipation of SMEs particularly important.
IV. 3 State Perspective – Cybersecurity and Protection against Cybercrime
The primary focus of the state coordinated assets in cybersecurity is the protection
against cybercrime and cyber warfare. The legal frameworks in the EU for the combat
against cybercrime are largely building upon the Budapest Convention on Cyber-
crime,132 an international treaty drawn up under auspices of Council of Europe and
adopted in 2001. It was by now ratified by 52 states,133 making it crucial part of inter-
national cooperation dealing with cybercrime. The aim of the treaty is primarily the
pursuit of common criminal policy against cybercrime.134 While setting important
founding stones for harmonisation of legislation and co-operation, the cybercrimes
defined in the convention reflect the time of early internet. The forms of cyberattack
that are most prevalent today are mostly not encompassed, particularly the ran-
somware or botnet infection.135 The principles and objectives of the convention served
as a base for the following progress on EU cybercrime legislation.136 ENISA was estab-
lished in 2004 to ensure high and effective level of network and information security
in the EU and help develop a culture of network and information security.137 This was
followed by cybersecurity strategies138 at the EU level and process towards adoption
of network and information security directive. The NIS Directive 2016/1148139
was adopted on 17th May 2016140 and the member states have to implement it until 
9th May 2018.141 The directive represents first EU-wide legislation on cybersecu-
132 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, CETS 185, Budapest, 2001.
133 Besides the EU member states are significant signatories the United States, Canada, Israel or Japan. Notable
non-signatories are Russia, China, India and Brazil, which significantly limits the effect of the treaty in the
global cyberspace. See Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 185. In: Council of Europe [online]. 10. 3.
2017 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://www.coe.int/web/conventions/full-list>.
134 Preamble to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
135 WEBER, R. H. Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things: Legal aspects, p. 723.
136 CLOUGH, J. A World of Difference: The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and the Challenges of Harmoni-
sation. Monash University Law Review. 2014, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 700–701.
137 Art. 1(1) Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 esta-
blishing the European Network and Information Security Agency.
138 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communication: A strategy for a Secure Information Society. In: Digital Single
Market [online]. 31. 5. 2006 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
news/communication-strategy-secure-information-society> and EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Communi-
cation on a Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union – An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. In: Di-
gital Single Market [online]. 2. 7. 2013 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
     <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communi-cation-cybersecurity-strategy-european-
union-%E2%80%93-open-safe-and-secure-cyberspace>.
139 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive).
140 EUROPEAN COUNCIL. EU-wide cybersecurity rules adopted by the Council. In: European Council [online].
17. 5. 2016 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/17-
wide-cybersecurity-rule-adopted/>.
141 Art 25 NIS Directive.
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rity,142 which should promote effective cooperation and achieve high common level of
protection within the EU.143 This legislation has wide reaching effects on national cy-
bersecurity legislation and organisation of national CSIRT units and their cooperation
within the EU. The SMEs are, however, in most cases not participating on operating
of the critical infrastructure and their exposure to cybersecurity law following the im-
plementation of NIS Directive is likely to stay peripheral. The directive is adding to
most national legislations two new categories of recipients. 
First are the operators or essential services.144 These services are generally defined as
essential for the maintenance of critical societal or economic activity, based on network
and information systems and with significant disruptive effect in case of cyber incident.145
The particular set of recipients will differ in each member state, but the entities falling
under the scope of this article are to be from sectors like energy, transportation, financial
or health.146 Given that the disruptive effect needs to be significant,147 it is primarily en-
compassing large enterprises, not SMEs. However, if a SME falls into this category, it will
have obligation to “(…) take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational
measures to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems
which they use in their operations.”148 It shall also have further obligations to minimise the
impact of eventual cyber incident and notify without undue delay the CSIRT or other com-
petent authority about significant incident.149 It is worth noticing that these obligations
basically mirror the structure of obligations of any data controller or processor with regard
to data security and data breach under the GDPR, even though the purpose, framework
and competent regulatory authority understandably differ considerably. The second group
includes digital service providers,150 specifically providers of online marketplace, online
search engine or cloud computing service.151 Even this category is unlikely to encompass
SMEs, but even if then the only obligation under the NIS Directive for these entities is
cyber incident notification in case of a substantial impact on the provision of the service.152
SMEs are therefore more likely to be affected by general national cybersecurity policies
or specific measures taken in response to widespread cyberattacks. Some SMEs may be sub-
ject to specific obligations under national law, particularly if they supply services to public
administration or operate important information infrastructure, but the majority of SMEs
stay under the radar of this type of legislation. Nonetheless, the aggregate role of SMEs in
142 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Network and Information Security Directive: co-legislators agree on the first EU-
wide legislation on cybersecurity. In: Digital Single Market [online]. 12. 9. 2015 [2017-12-09]. Available at:
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/network-and-information-security-directive-co-legis-
lators-agree-first-eu-wide-legislation>.
143 Art. 1(1) NIS Directive.
144 Art. 5 NIS Directive.
145 Art. 5(2) NIS Directive.
146 Annex II. to NIS Directive.
147 Particular criteria are based on Art. 6 NIS Directive.
148 Art. 14(1) NIS Directive.
149 Art. 14 (2,3) NIS Directive.
150 Art. 4(5) NIS Directive.
151 Annex III. to NIS Directive.
152 Art. 16(3) NIS Directive.
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the emerging digital economy is likely to remain significant and with the spread of IoT adop-
tion, there may be need for more broadly coordinated cybersecurity efforts including SMEs.
V. DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper is to highlight a particular challenge that the digital economy is
likely to have on SMEs. The spread of IoT devices interacting with their corporate networks
will likely mean more frequent and more damaging cybersecurity threats. The SMEs pos-
sess particular features that make them likely victims of cybercrime and that limit their
capacity for adequate cybersecurity. Furthermore, the increased attention devoted to cy-
bersecurity on the side of primary cybercrime targets153 may further add to the pressure
on SMEs. This is in the economic literature described as negative spill-over effect.154 Cy-
bersecurity is largely a game of chasing the weakest link leading to the richest bounty and
SMEs end up being increasingly popular targets in this regard.
Given the particular features of cyber incident cost distribution, there may often be lack
of incentive for the SME to invest into cybersecurity and prevent an event that takes a form
of negative externality, given that the victim is remote and unrelated and the damage is
often intangible and ambiguous. This deformity of cybersecurity risk distribution has fea-
tures of market failure,155 as the externality of incurred costs limits the demand for secure
solutions by entities that need to implement them.156 The SMEs stand in this regard on
various positions of the failing equation. They may be the producer that is not motivated
to develop a product with security by design in mind. They may be the provider of service
that does not value adequately the risk of data breach or addition to botnet for DDoS at-
tack on critical infrastructure. They may also be the victim that relied on weak security
solution or which assets became target of cybercrime. This versatility, together with their
significance for innovation, employment and economic growth, makes SMEs a particu-
larly demonstrative category for analysis of cybersecurity challenges presented by new
technologies. Their capacity to deal with the challenges is limited by default through their
budget, headcount or know-how. Cybersecurity often takes low priority in the perception
of the SME executives and owners, as they assume that the enterprise holds no valuable
assets compared to larger entities. There is broad adoption of so called “security by ob-
scurity” approach.157
153 Reports indicate increasing cybersecurity investment, particularly by large entities or components of critical
infrastructure. E.g. CYBERSECURITY INSIDERS. 2017 Cybersecurity Trends Report. In: Cybersecurity Insiders
[online]. [2017-11-11]. Available at: <https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/portfolio/cybersecurity-trends-
report/>; or PWC. Global State of Information Security® Survey 2017. In: PWC [online]. 2017 [2017-11-11]. Ava-
ilable at: < https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cybersecurity/information-security-survey.html>.
154 KOBAYASHI, B. Private versus social incentives in cybersecurity: Law and economics. In: The Law and Econo-
mics of Cybersecurity [online]. 2005. [2017-12-09] Available at:
      <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289775072_Private_versus_social_incentives_in_cybersecurity_
Law_and_economics>, pp. 26 et seq.
155 INFINEON – NXP – STMICROELECTRONICS – ENISA. Common Position On Cybersecurity, p. 1.
156 CLARKE, R. The prospects of easier security for small organisations and consumers. pp. 544 et seq.
157 GRONER, R., BRUNE, P. Towards an Empirical Examination of IT Security Infrastructures in SME. In: Nordic
Conference on Secure IT Systems: Secure IT Systems [online]. 2012 [2017-12-09]. Available at: <https://link.sprin-
ger.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-34210-3_6>. 
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As indicated in the previous chapter, there is no lack of regulatory frameworks creating
obligations for entities including SMEs with regard to cybersecurity measures. Yet the real
challenge the entities are facing with regard to these obligations is in their complexity.
Even if the SME management is aware and vary of the risks it is facing, there is great un-
certainty about the proper approach and adequate measures to be taken to comply with
the regulation and to achieve an appropriate level of security. The labyrinthine require-
ments included across various legislative frameworks discourage adequate compliance,
particularly if the recipient is microenterprise with few employees, limited cybersecurity
know-how, primary focus in unrelated field and numerous other administrative and reg-
ulatory obligations to cope with. 
Standage in his recent article offers a great lesson that can be learned about cyberse-
curity from maybe the first ‘hack’ of communication. The story is about Blanc brothers,
exchange traders from Bordeaux, who modified the early mechanical telegraph messages
between 1834 and 1836. They hacked the system by bribing the operators. There are many
parallels that the article aptly draws to the current state of cybersecurity. It is mostly the
human failing not technological vulnerability that is the weakest link of the system or net-
work. At the same time, it is naïve to hope for technological solution to this weakness.
Rather than attempting impenetrable systems, resiliency, awareness, understanding and
adaptability are the way forward is cybersecurity. After all, the malicious activities are here
with us to stay, as they are part of human nature.158
The upcoming boom of IoT devices is likely to raise the stakes higher and further stress
the capacities of SMEs to achieve needed measures. The growingly diverse technological
dimension of the issue will bring new challenges through transformation of the role and
scope of ICT in the SME business operations. It is not that cybersecurity can be made per-
fectly impenetrable with any system of measures or for any amount of investment, as it
generally follows a function of diminishing returns,159 but a minimal level of protection
must be achieved and this cannot be directly bound to optimization of implementation
costs, as otherwise the requirement misses its purpose. The actual adequate application
of cybersecurity principles and measures is generally based on rather practical approach
to achievable solutions,160 however, limited understanding, confusing guidelines and frag-
mented best practices often creates obstacles for recipients without expert knowledge.161
The challenge of regulation in the field of SME cybersecurity is similar to the challenge
in most areas related to the cyberspace or new technologies. Given the fast changing tech-
nology landscape, any regulatory approach is faced with the “pacing problem”.162 The most
flexible regulation can be provided by self-regulatory frameworks, these, however, tend to
158 STANDAGE, T. Rewind: The crooked timber of humanity. In: The Economist 1843 [online]. 2017 [2017-12-09].
Available at: <https://www.1843magazine.com/technology/rewind/the-crooked-timber-of-humanity>. 
159 See GORDON, L., LOEB, M. The Economics of Information Security Investment. ACM Transactions on Infor-
mation and System Security. 2002, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 445.
160 A great practical guide in this regard was provided by CRUME, J. Inside Internet Security: What Hackers Don’t
Want You To Know. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2000. 
161 CLARKE, R. The prospects of easier security for small organisations and consumers, p. 539.
162 MARCHANT, G. E., ALLENBY, B. R., HERKERT, eds. The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and
Legal Ethical Oversight. Springer, 2011, p. 7. 
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succumb to the rules of market forces.163 The public authority therefore needs to set and
supervise regulatory regime with regard to the externalities that the self-regulatory ap-
proach generates. GDPR as well as the NIS directive exemplify an active pursuit of this
goal. The hype around their implementation provides a rare window of increased attention
to cybersecurity measures by many, including the SMEs. This opportunity should be
seized to send a message about the importance of cybersecurity for SMEs not only in cur-
rent settings, but particularly in face of upcoming advances in ICT development.164
The SMEs need to be guided through the complexity of the issue and clearly commu-
nicated the added value of the required measures. The awareness needs to be heightened
to the threats related to IoT connectivity, but particularly to the solutions and best prac-
tices that allow the implementation of these devices in the business operations of SMEs.
The cybersecurity or data protection requirements need to be implemented in a fashion
that does not add to the difficulty of doing business for the SMEs. A combination of un-
derstandable guidelines,165 encouraging stimuli166 and restrained sanctions following
timely security audit167 can prepare the European SMEs for the era of IoT. Failure or hold-
up of this process may on the other hand give rise to additional obstacles to doing business
and aggravate the negative impact of connectivity in the emerging Single digital market.
VI. CONCLUSION
There current development in the EU indicates a growing awareness to the issues of
cybersecurity and data protection. The role and specific position of SMEs is to a large de-
gree recognized, but IoT should be perceived with greater attention to the particular effects
on the SMEs capacity of doing business. Further development of guidelines and support
tools should be encouraged in order to provide the SMEs with better understanding of
their obligations and their purpose in the interconnected data economy.
163 CLARKE, R. The prospects of easier security for small organisations and consumers. p. 544.
164 INFINEON – NXP – STMICROELECTRONICS – ENISA. Common Position On Cybersecurity, p. 3.
165 INFINEON – NXP – STMICROELECTRONICS – ENISA. Common Position On Cybersecurity, p. 2. The previously
mentioned guidelines for SMEs with regard to obligations under GDPR exemplify this form of support. See
ENISA. Guidelines for SMEs on the security of personal data processing. 
166 CLARKE, R. The prospects of easier security for small organisations and consumers, p. 544. The stimulatory me-
asures include particularly support of research like the above mentioned LEVERETT, E., CLAYTON, R., ANDER-
SON, R. Standardisation and Certification of the ‘Internet of Things’. Also awareness campaigns, like European
Cyber Security Month, help focus the attention in the right direction. See ENISA. European Cyber Security
Month. In: Enisa [online]. [2017-10-02]. Available at: <https://cybersecuritymonth.eu/>.
167 The need for timely audit as precondition for effective incentive by non-compliance sanction is highlighted
e.g. by LAUBE, S., BÖHME, R. The Economics of Mandatory Security Breach Reporting to Authorities. Journal
of Cybersecurity. 2016, Vol. 2, No. 1, [2017-10-10]. Available at:
      <http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2015/papers/WEIS_2015_laube.pdf>.  
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